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ABSTRACT
Do societies choose inefficient policies and institutions, in contrast to what would be suggested
by a reasoning extending the Coase Theorem to politics? Do societies choose inefficient policies and
institutions because of differences in the beliefs and ideologies of their peoples or leaders? Or are
inefficiencies in politics and economics the outcome of social and distributional conflicts? This paper
discusses these various approaches to political economy, and develops the argument that there are strong
empirical and theoretical grounds for believing that inefficient policies and institutions are prevalent, and
that they are chosen because they serve the interests of politicians or social groups holding political
power, at the expense of the society at large. At the center of the theoretical case are the commitment
problems inherent in politics: parties holding political power cannot make commitments to bind their
future actions because there is no outside agency with the coercive capacity to enforce such arrangements.
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T h e r ei si n c r e a s i n gi n t e r e s ti nt h ee ﬀects of government policies, economic, political and
legal institutions, and more broadly, of the organization of society on economic outcomes.
There is also a sense among economists and social scientists that diﬀerences in policies
and institutions are a ﬁrst-order determinant of the very diﬀerent economic and social
fortunes of various countries, though we are far from a consensus on this point. Despite
the range of important contributions on these topics (see, for example, the surveys in
Austen-Smith and Banks, 1999, and Persson and Tabellini, 2000), we still do not know
how to organize our thinking on the determinants of policies and institutions.1 Why do
certain societies choose diﬀerent policies, diﬀerent institutions, radically diﬀerent ways of
organizing their lives? This paper is an attempt to provide a simple taxonomy, and argue
for the relevance of a particular approach.
The taxonomy consists of grouping various approaches into three categories:
1. Political Coase Theorem (PCT): the Coase Theorem maintains that when property
rights are well-deﬁned and there are no “transaction costs”, economic agents will
“contract” to achieve an eﬃcient (output- or surplus-maximizing) outcome, irre-
spective of who has the property rights on particular assets (Coase, 1960, Stigler,
1966). An extension of this reasoning to the political sphere would suggest that
political and economic transactions create a strong tendency towards policies and
institutions that achieve the best outcomes given the varying needs and require-
ments of societies, irrespective of who, or which social group, has political power.
According to this approach, policy and institutional diﬀerences are not the major
determinant of the diﬀerences in economic outcomes, since societies choose, at least
approximately, the “right” policies and institutions given their conditions.
2. Theories of Belief Diﬀerences (Modiﬁed Political Coase Theorem) societies may
1There is an important distinction between policies and institutions. We can loosely think of policies
as choices made within a given political and social structure, e.g., the tax rate and ﬁscal policies. In
contrast, institutions can be thought as determinants of the political and social structure that are more
durable, and as such, constrain future choices and policies, e.g., whether the society is democratic or not,
the nature of the legal constraints on the government, or the extent of private property rights enforcement.
Although institutions are often predetermined at the point in time when certain policy choices are made,
they are also chosen by the society. For example, governments and citizens decide what legal code will
apply, and how stringently it will be enforced. The focus here is on why both ineﬃcient policies and
ineﬃcient institutions are chosen and continue to be chosen. So for most of this paper I will not make
much of a distinction between policies and institutions.
1choose diﬀerent policies, with very diﬀerent implications, because they–or their
leaders–disagree about what would be good for the society. According to this
approach, there is suﬃcient uncertainty about the right policies and institutions
that well-meaning political actors diﬀer about what is good for their own people.
S o c i e t i e sw h e r et h el e a d e r so rt h ee l e c t o r a t et u r no u tt ob er i g h te xp o s ta r et h o s e
that prosper. The important point is that, just as with the PCT, there are strong
forces preventing the implementation of policies that are known to be bad for the
society at large, hence the label Modiﬁed Political Coase Theorem.
3. Theories of Social Conﬂict: societies choose diﬀerent policies, some very disastrous
for their citizens, because those decisions are made by politicians or politically pow-
erful social groups that are interested in maximizing their own payoﬀs, not aggregate
output or social welfare. This category includes both theories where internal conﬂict
within the society leads to ineﬃcient choices and those where ineﬃcient institutions
and policies are imposed on societies from the outside (e.g., by colonial powers).2
At some level, the major divide is between Theories of Social Conﬂict, which em-
phasize the prevalence of systematically ineﬃcient government policies and institutional
arrangements, versus the ﬁrst two approaches, which stress the presence of social forces
that rule out these types of ineﬃciencies. The rest of the paper argues that the PCT,
in its simple form, or in its modiﬁed version built on belief diﬀerences, is not an appro-
priate framework for thinking about policy and institutional diﬀerences across countries.
2This taxonomy implicitly classiﬁes a lot of interesting theories that combine features from the three
groups, while still giving a prominent role to social conﬂict, in the category of Theories of Social Conﬂict.
Most important, in many theories featuring social conﬂict, societies will make diﬀerent choices because
of diﬀerences in their economic conditions, but generally there will not be strong forces towards eﬃcient
outcomes in any of these societies.
A number of interesting interactions are also worth mentioning brieﬂy. For example, certain groups
may attempt, or manage, to convince others that their most-preferred policies also beneﬁt the society at
large (see Coate and Morris, 1995, for a model with this ﬂavor). Another interesting interaction arises
when some societies choose diﬀerent policies initially because of diﬀerences in beliefs, but then these
policies create or strengthen their own political constituencies, supporting the continued implementation
of these ineﬃcient policies (see Acemoglu, Aghion and Zilibotti, 2002, for a model with this ﬂavor).
Another set of approaches, especially popular among sociologists and political scientists, is also worth
mentioning here. These also maintain that many policies and institutions are ineﬃcient, but contrary to
Theories of Social Conﬂict, they do not attempt to explain these ineﬃciencies by the economic or social
objectives of competing groups. Instead, institutions and policies are presumed to arise as unintended
consequences of other interactions. A salient example is Tilly’s (1990) work, and its extension by Herbst
(2000), which stresses the importance of the emergence of the nation-state for economic development,
but whether the nation-state emerges or not is a consequence of other unrelated factors, for example
population density or the frequency of wars.
2Existing evidence suggests that societies often choose ineﬃcient policies and institutions,
and in most cases they do this not because of diﬀerences in beliefs, but because of severe
misalignments in the economic interests of politically decisive actors and the rest of the
society. So Theories of Social Conﬂict appear to provide the right starting point for an
analysis of policy and institutional diﬀerences.
A major challenge for Theories of Social Conﬂict, however, is to pinpoint what spe-
ciﬁc “transaction costs” would systematically prevent the Political Coase Theorem from
applying. In other words, why do politicians and powerful social groups not make a deal
with the rest of the society to choose the policies and institutions that maximize output
(or social welfare), and then redistribute part of the gains to themselves? Put even more
strongly; why do powerful groups not “predate” eﬃciently? The theoretical analysis is
intended to highlight some of the issues that arise in thinking about these questions.
The argument I develop in Sections 4 and 5 of the paper is that, although the PCT may
be a useful benchmark, its applicability is limited because of the inherent commitment
problems associated with political power. Underlying the Coase Theorem is the ability to
write enforceable contracts. Any enforcement problem will therefore potentially limit the
applicability of the Coase Theorem.3 In the context of the PCT, there is a natural reason
for widespread enforcement problems. Most contracts are enforced by “the state”. When
it comes to contracts that the state or social groups controlling the state would like to
write with others (e.g., the citizens), they will, by deﬁnition, be non-enforceable because
groups controlling the state cannot commit not to using their power to renege on their
promises or not to changing the terms of the contract. This implies that the allocation
of political power creates an inherent commitment problem, undermining the potential to
reach eﬃcient outcomes.
The commitment problem associated with the PCT is twofold: ﬁrst, those in power,
e.g., the rulers, cannot commit to not using this power–as long as they do not relinquish
i t – i nw a y st h a tb e n e ﬁt them in the future. Second, if the rulers relinquish their power,
the citizens cannot commit to making side payments to them in the future, because the
3Enforcement problems may arise from incomplete information, contracting costs or bounded ratio-
nality (e.g., Anderlini and Felli, 1998, Dixit and Olson, 2000, Farrell, 1987, McKelvey and Page, 1999). I
focus on the commitment problems here, because I believe these are much more central when it comes to
the PCT. The recent literature on transaction costs and the organization of the ﬁrm (e.g., Williamson,
1981, Grossman and Hart, 1986, Hart and Moore, 1990) similarly focuses on why the distribution of
property rights may matter for incentives when contracts are incomplete. There are a number of informal
attempts to extend the reasoning of transaction costs to politics, see, for example, North (1990) or Spiller
and Tommasi (2002).
3former rulers no longer possess the political power to enforce such promises. This double
commitment problem restricts the potential remedies to ineﬃciencies. Nevertheless, be-
cause the relationship between the state and the citizens is repeated, there may be some
amount of commitment based on reputation–supported by the threat of future punish-
ments. As a result, the extent to which the PCT will provide a good approximation to
reality depends on the possibility of commitment via constitutions or other institutions
and on how good a substitute this type of reputation-based commitment is for enforceable
contracts, as well as on the extent of distributional conﬂict between various social groups
in society.
To focus on the inherent commitment problems present in political situations, the sim-
ple model analyzed here allows unrestricted transfers and taxes, including non-distortionary
lump-sum taxes. The ineﬃciencies arise not because of some restrictions on the technology
of taxation, but because of the political-economic interactions between diﬀerent groups
and agents. Interestingly, despite the availability of non-distortionary taxes, the model
also suggests that in this type of repeated game environment, the equilibrium may involve
distortionary taxes. The reason is that the allocation has to satisfy the incentive com-
patibility constraint of the ruler, which requires the current output not to be too large;
otherwise, the ruler would prefer to grab all the output rather than stick to the agreement.
With lump-sum taxes, individuals are the residual claimants of the returns they generate
from their investments, and will have a tendency to “overinvest”, violating the incentive
compatibility constraint of the ruler. Distortionary taxation may then be necessary to
guarantee levels of investment consistent with the incentive compatibility constraint of
the ruler.
There is a large literature on distortionary policies of governments, which is nicely
surveyed in Robinson (1998), with a similar distinction to the one here between bad
policies that arise due to belief diﬀerences and those originating from social conﬂict. The
most celebrated models of distortionary policies are the voting models, where the median
or the decisive voter may choose policies that redistribute resources from the society
as a whole to himself or to his group (e.g., Romer, 1975, Meltzer and Richards, 1981,
or see Persson and Tabellini, 2000). There is also a large literature in political science
on how voting behavior and the organization of parties interact to produce equilibrium
policies (see, for example, Aldrich, 1983, Baron and Ferejohn, 1989, Dixit and Londregan,
1995, Myerson, 1995, Snyder, 1990). A range of other papers emphasize conﬂict between
4bureaucrats or politicians and the society, for example, Buchanan and Tullock (1962),
Ferejohn, (1986), Persson, Roland and Tabellini (1997), and Shleifer and Vishny (1998).
These papers do not consider why politically powerful groups cannot extract resources
from the rest of the society in an eﬃcient manner, however. In fact, much of this literature
rules out eﬃcient methods of redistribution and takes it for granted that rent-maximizing
behavior by rulers or the government will result in ineﬃciencies. The focus here is instead
on why eﬃcient policies fail to arise. In this respect, this paper is related to North
(1981), Libecap (1989) and Olson (2000), who emphasize ineﬃcient policies resulting from
distributional conﬂicts. North, for example, suggests that rulers will choose the system of
property rights in order to maximize their return, and this will lead to ineﬃciencies, but
he also places considerable emphasis on diﬀerences in beliefs. Neither North nor Libecap
nor Olson is explicit, however, on why a version of the Political Coase Theorem would
not apply.
By providing a rationale for ineﬃcient methods of taxation, this paper also relates to a
few existing studies investigating the reasons why, in many instances, societies use ineﬃ-
cient redistributive policies rather than lump-sum taxation and transfers. Rodrik (1986),
Wilson (1991) and Becker and Mulligan (1998) argue that if the amount of redistribution
is endogenous, then politicians might want to commit to using ineﬃcient methods in order
to reduce total redistribution. Coate and Morris (1995) argue that ineﬃcient redistribu-
tion arises when politicians exploit the uncertainty of voters regarding which policies are
eﬃcient. In this context, most closely related are Besley and Coate (1998), Acemoglu
and Robinson (2000b and 2002), Rajan and Zingales (2000), and Acemoglu and Robinson
(2001). Besley and Coate analyze a two-period political economy model, and show how
certain types of “ineﬃciencies” may arise because eﬃcient policies would aﬀect the iden-
tity of who is in power (though they limit the politicians to linear taxes), and similarly
emphasize the importance of commitment problems.4 Acemoglu and Robinson (2000b
and 2002) develop a theory where elites may want to block the introduction of new and
eﬃcient technologies because this will reduce their future political power, and similarly,
Rajan and Zingales (2000) show how organizations make ineﬃcient choices because each
4Other related papers emphasizing the importance of commitment issues in politics include: North and
Weingast (1989), who argue that the introduction of the English Parliament in the seventeenth century
was a commitment to low taxes in the future; Weingast (1998) who interprets the Missouri compromise
as a commitment by Northerners not to attempt to abolish slavery in the South; and ﬁnally Acemoglu
and Robinson (2000a), who argue that the introduction of democracy was a commitment by the rich elite
to future redistribution.
5group (or agent) is worried that others in the organization will get richer, and demand
more concessions in the future. Finally, Acemoglu and Robinson show that ineﬃcient
methods of redistribution, rather than more eﬃcient alternatives, may arise as a method
of maintaining future political power (see also Persson and Svensson, 1989, and Aghion
and Bolton, 1990, on the use of ﬁscal policy to aﬀect future elections). None of these pa-
pers address the more general issue of how commitment problems undermine the “Political
Coase Theorem”, which is the focus of the current paper, nor do they analyze repeated
games where punishment strategies may substitute for lack of formal commitment.5
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section revisits the above tax-
onomy of various approaches to the determination of policies and institutions introduced
above. Section 3 argues that in practice, neither the PCT nor the Modiﬁed PCT provide a
satisfactory framework for studying cross-country diﬀerences in institutions and policies.
Sections 4 and 5 analyze a simple model of conﬂict between the ruler and the citizens,
highlight the commitment problems inherent in political transactions, and show why the
reasoning of the PCT will not apply in general. This analysis also develops some simple
comparative statics from the model, and shows why distortionary taxes may be neces-
sary to reduce overinvestment by citizens, which would otherwise violate the incentive
compatibility constraint of rulers.
2A S i m p l e T a x o n o m y
To emphasize the diﬀerences between various approaches and build a simple taxonomy,
consider the following setup, with Y denoting aggregate output or consumption, which I
take to represent social welfare (thus avoiding some of the complications that come from
Pareto comparisons, and focusing on the main point here). Moreover, suppose that we
can write
Y = F (X,P),
where X is a vector of economic, geographic, social or other characteristics that are taken
as given and directly inﬂuence economic outcomes, and P is a vector of policies and
institutions that can potentially aﬀect the outcomes of interest. I deﬁne P(. | X) as the
5In focusing on inﬁnite-horizon models with self-enforcing arrangements, this model is also similar to
Dixit, Grossman, and Gul (2000) who analyze self-enforcing political deals between groups with diﬀerent
interests.
6set of policies that maximize output, given a vector of characteristics X, i.e.,
P
∗ (X) ∈ P(. | X) ⇐⇒ P
∗ (X) ∈ argmax
P
F (X,P).
The Political Coase Theorem maintains that there are strong forces leading societies
towards some P∗ (X) in P(. | X). The underlying idea is that if a society is pursuing
a policy P (X) / ∈ P(. | X),t h e nas w i t c ht oP∗ (X) ∈ P(. | X) will create aggregate
gains. If these gains correspond to a Pareto improvement, then all political systems will
implement this change. If the change creates only a potential Pareto improvement, then
part of the gains can be redistributed to those that are losing out via various mechanisms,
or at the very least, the winners can lobby or vote for the beneﬁcial change. A number
of social scientists have proposed limited forms of this Political Coase Theorem. Becker
(1983, 1985), for example, pointed out how competition between pressure groups could
create a force towards eﬃcient policies. Wittman (1995) pushed this argument further and
formulated an informal Political Coase Theorem for democratic societies. Wittman argued
that with rational voters, democratic societies generally produce Pareto eﬃcient, even
wealth-maximizing, outcomes. In fact, Wittman’s argument relies little on democratic
institutions, and his reasoning could even apply to nondemocratic societies.
To the extent that P(. | X) is not a singleton, we can observe considerable policy
diﬀerences across two identical societies, but the performance of these two societies should
n o tb ea p p r e c i a b l yd i ﬀerent. An example could be diﬀerences in policies regarding the
role of the government in the economy between the Anglo-Saxon economies, in particular,
the U.S. and the UK, and Continental European countries, which do not seem to lead to
major diﬀerences in the economic performance between these two sets of countries.6
When we look at a cross-section of societies in the data, however, we also see more
major diﬀerences in policies and institutions, for example, free-market policies in some
societies like Hong Kong, and heavy government involvement and widespread corruption
in some others like Indonesia. But according to the PCT, various government interventions
and corruption in Indonesia are not the reason why this country is poorer than Hong Kong.
Each is choosing the policies and institutions that are appropriate for their own situations,
but they achieve diﬀerent outcomes because their situations, their X’s, are diﬀerent.
More speciﬁcally, for two societies with characteristics X and X0 6= X, we typically have
F (X,P∗ (X)) 6= F (X0,P∗ (X0)),a n dm o r e o v e r ,F (X,P∗ (X)) >F (X,P∗ (X0)) and
6See Hall and Soskice (2001) for a discussion of the costs and beneﬁts of various diﬀerent types of
capitalism.
7F (X0,P∗ (X0)) >F(X0,P∗ (X)). Thus, the PCT suggests that Indonesian institutions
are not chosen ineﬃciently, but appropriately for their circumstances.7
This discussion implies that to refute the applicability of the Political Coase Theorem,
we need to ﬁnd systematic evidence that there are societies choosing P while F (X,P) <
F (X,P0) for some feasible alternative P0,o rs i m p l yt h a tP/ ∈ P(. | X). That is, we need
to show that there are societies that persistently pursue wrong policies, with signiﬁcant
output and welfare consequences.8
Theories of Belief Diﬀerences (Modiﬁed PCT), on the other hand, emphasize that
some subset of X, Xu, is uncertain. To simplify the notation while elaborating on this,
suppose that P(. | X) is a singleton, in particular P(. | X)=P∗ (X). Moreover, imagine
that X =( Xc,X u), and suppose that P∗ (Xc,X u) 6= P∗ (Xc,X0
u) whenever Xu 6= X0
u,t h a t
is, these uncertain characteristics aﬀect which policies are right for the society. Suppose
that politicians (or the society at large) have beliefs, denoted by G(Xu),o v e rt h ea c t u a l
distribution of Xu. Also suppose that social welfare maximization corresponds to the
maximization of expected aggregate output. Then deﬁne
P




Now two societies with the same Xc, and the same ex post realization of Xu,m a yc h o o s e
diﬀerent policies because their ex ante beliefs over the payoﬀ-relevant characteristics, the
Xu’s, are diﬀerent. Given a particular realization of Xu, some societies among those with
the same Xc and Xu will be richer than others, i.e., typically F (Xc,X u,P∗ (Xc,G)) 6=
F (Xc,X u,P∗ (Xc,G 0)) for G 6= G0.
For example, the North Koreans may be choosing socialist policies and government
ownership because they believe those are the policies that will increase welfare, while South
Korea, which presumably had the same characteristics, Xc and Xu, chose a capitalist
development path. Ex post, the South Koreans turned out to be right, hence they were
the ones who adopted the right policies, and the ones who prospered, while North Koreans
today suﬀer poverty and famine.9
7See Glaesar and Shleifer (2002) for an explanation for why Britain and France chose very diﬀerent
legal codes and systems that were appropriate to their underlying circumstances.
8Throughout by “refuting” the PCT, I mean showing that there are signiﬁcant and quantitatively
important ineﬃciencies in the institutions and policieso fs o m es o c i e t i e s – o fc o u r s e ,t h i sd e ﬁnition poses
the question of what is “signiﬁcant and quantitatively important”. A refutation of the PCT does not
imply that there are no forces towards more eﬃcient arrangements.
9An interesting theory of policy diﬀerences arising from belief diﬀerences is developed by Piketty
8To refute the class of models in this group, we need to show that there are societies
that pursue policies that could not be the right policies under any plausible scenario. In
other words, denoting the set of admissible beliefs by G, if, for two feasible policies, P
and P0,
R
F (Xc,X u,P0)dG ≥
R
F (Xc,X u,P)dG for all G ∈ G, then we should never
observe P.
Finally, according to the Theories of Social Conﬂict, societies often, knowingly, choose
some policy vector P (X) / ∈ P(. | X), because policies and institutions are chosen to
maximize the payoﬀs of those who hold political power, not to maximize social welfare or
aggregate income. To emphasize the diﬀerence between this approach and the Political
Coase Theorem, imagine another vector of variables Z,w h i c hdo not directly aﬀect Y ,t h u s
P∗ (X) is independent of Z. These variables may nonetheless inﬂuence the “equilibrium”
policy, so we can have P (X,Z). Changes in Z will have no direct eﬀect on output, but
may have a powerful indirect impact by inﬂuencing the gap between P (X,Z) and P∗ (X).
In other words, we need to ﬁnd a variable, Z, that is like an instrument in econometrics:
it inﬂuences X, but has no direct eﬀect on F.
At this level of generality, Theories of Social Conﬂict are more like a residual group;
if we can show that certain societies systematically, and knowingly, pursue ineﬃcient
policies, we are in the realm of Theories of Social Conﬂict. But the usefulness of these
theories depends, in turn, on whether they can pinpoint an interesting mechanism for why
political and economic bargains are not struck to achieve better policies and institutions
(i.e., what are the salient “transaction costs” preventing the PCT from applying?), and
whether we can identify a range of institutional or other social variables, the Z’s, that
aﬀect the degree of ineﬃciency of policies.
3 What the Data Say
In this section, I brieﬂy develop the argument that cross-country diﬀerences in policies
and institutions are important determinants of economic performance, and the origins
of these diﬀerences do not lie in diﬀerent perceptions of the peoples and the leaders, but
in the social conﬂicts that exist between these leaders, or the social groups that these
leaders represent, and the rest of the society. As noted above, the purpose of this exercise
(1995) where individuals vote over the degree of redistribution in the economy as a function of their
beliefs on the importance of individual eﬀort in economic success. These beliefs, in turn, evolve as a
result of various economic interactions and tax policies. See Romer (1997) and Mukand and Rodrik
(2002) for recent studies arguing for the importance of these issues.
9is not to argue that there are no economic and political forces towards more eﬃcient social
arrangements, but to show that there are salient examples of ineﬃcient institutions and
policies, accounting for quantitatively large variations in economic performance.
Recall also that societies may choose ineﬃcient policies and institutions both because
of internal conﬂict and because these choices are imposed on them externally. Although
ineﬃciencies arising from internal conﬂi c ta r ea tl e a s ta si m p o r t a n t ,i nt h el a t t e rp a r to f
this section I focus on two examples of ineﬃcient institutions imposed by outside forces,
because these episodes make it clear that these institutional choices were not in response
to diﬀerent economic circumstances (i.e., they exploit sources of exogenous variation from
history).
3.1 Diﬀerences in Institutions and Economic Outcomes
There are tremendous cross-country diﬀerences in the way that economic and political
life is organized. Let us focus here on a range of characteristics which we can think of
as “economic institutions,” for example, the degree of stable property rights enforcement,
the extent of equal opportunity and of entry barriers. A voluminous literature documents
large cross-country diﬀerences in economic institutions, and a strong correlation between
these institutions and economic performance.
To pick a few examples, Knack and Keefer (1995) look at measures of property rights
enforcement compiled by international business organizations (in particular Political and
Risk Services), Mauro (1995) looks at measures of corruption, and Djankov, La Porta,
Lopez-De-Silanes and Shleifer (2002) compile measures of entry barriers across countries,
while many studies look at variation in educational institutions and the corresponding
diﬀerences in human capital (e.g., Ringer, 1979, Krueger and Lindahl, 2001, Hanushek
and Kimko, 2000). All of these authors ﬁnd substantial diﬀerences in these measures
of economic institutions, and signiﬁcant correlation between these measures and various
indicators of economic performance. For example, Djankov et al. document that, while the
total cost of opening a medium-size business in the United States is less than 0.02 percent
of GDP per capita in 1999, the same cost is 2.7 percent of GDP per capita in Nigeria, 1.16
percent in Kenya 0.91 percent in Ecuador and 4.95 percent in the Dominican Republic.
These entry barriers are highly correlated with various economic outcomes, including the
rate of economic growth and the level of development.
A defender of the PCT could counter these empirical patterns with the following
10argument: this type of correlation does not establish that countries are choosing the
wrong institutions. After all, the United States diﬀers from Nigeria, Kenya and the Do-
minican Republic in its economic characteristics, i.e., its X’s. And diﬀerent X’s require
diﬀerent optimal (appropriate) policies and institutions. In terms of the notation intro-
d u c e da b o v e ,i tm a yb et h ec a s et h a tX 6= X0, and consequently, P∗ (X) 6= P∗ (X0),a n d
F (X,P∗ (X)) 6= F (X0,P∗ (X0)), so we might simply be observing the optimal response
of diﬀerent societies to their own varying conditions. Perhaps, given the circumstances in
the Dominican Republic, it is not worth investing in the arrangements to reduce the costs
of opening and doing business (or in the modiﬁed form of the PCT, perhaps the people
of the Dominican Republic believe that high entry barriers are good for the society).10
To refute the general applicability of the PCT for analyzing diﬀerences in institutions
and policies across countries, and their impact on economic outcomes, we need to show
that otherwise identical, or at least similar, societies choose diﬀerent institutions and
policies because of reasons that do not directly aﬀect economic outcomes, and experience
diﬀerential economic performances as a result of these choices. This is essentially the
reasoning of instrumental variables. Therefore, to refute the PCT, we have to ﬁnd a
source of variation, the Z’s, that do not directly inﬂuence economic outcomes, but aﬀect
the choice of policies and institutions, and then show that these diﬀerences matter for
economic outcomes. In other words, we have to ﬁnd some type of natural (or “unnatural”)
social experiment where for political or historical reasons some societies end up with very
diﬀerent institutions than others (in addition, if we also want to refute the modiﬁed PCT,
w ew o u l dh a v et os h o wt h a tt h ev a r i a t i o nc a p t u r e db yt h eZ’s is not working solely
through belief diﬀerences). Naturally, the focus on historical and sources of variation
in institutions and policies does not mean that these provide the most major reason for
cross-country diﬀerences. Internal dynamics leading to diﬀerent policies institutions are
likely to be at least as important, but for the purposes of this exercise, external sources
of variation make identiﬁcation easier.
10An example of optimal non-enforcement of private property rights may be the case of North American
Indians before the eighteenth century. Demsetz (1967) argues that despite the potential for overhunting
of game, the costs of enforcing property rights in land were higher than the beneﬁts, since without the fur
market, there were only weak incentives for overhunting. This changed after the Indians started trading
fur with the white Americans, at which point the incentives for overhunting and the costs of lack of
property rights increased, and private property rights in land were duly introduced.
113.2 Colonialism and Institutional Development
European colonization of the rest of the world provides the best laboratory (almost a
natural experiment) to investigate these issues. From the late 15th century, Europeans
dominated and colonized much of the rest of the Globe. Together with European domi-
nance came the imposition of various types of institutions in the colonies. Most interesting
for our purposes, Europeans imposed very diﬀerent institutions and social power struc-
tures in diﬀerent parts of the world.
Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001) document that in a large number of colonies,
especially those in Africa, Central America, the Caribbean and South Asia, European
powers set up “extractive states”. These institutions did not introduce much protection
for private property, nor did they provide checks and balances against government ex-
propriation. The explicit aim of the Europeans in these colonies was the extraction of
resources, in one form or another. In the Caribbean, this took the form of slave planta-
tions, in parts of Central and Meso America, mining based on forced labor. In Africa,
Europeans were ﬁrst interested in the extraction of slaves to employ on the plantations in
the Americas, and later developed other methods of extracting resources, including high
taxes and extraction of natural resources.11 Other economic institutions that Europeans
set up in these colonies were similarly detrimental to economic advancement; there was
little investment in the human capital of the majority of the population, and access to
key resources was concentrated in the hands of a few.
This colonization strategy and the associated institutions contrast with the institutions
Europeans set up in colonies where they settled in large numbers, for example, the United
States, Canada, Australia and New Zealand. In these colonies, life was modeled after the
home country, and the emphasis was on the enforcement of property rights for a broad
cross-section of the society, especially smallholders, merchants and entrepreneurs. See for
example Gann and Duignan (1962), Robinson and Gallagher (1961), Denoon (1983), Cain
and Hopkins (1993).
11For example, Davis and Huttenback (1986, p. 307) calculate that before 1885, investment in the
British empire had a return 25 percent higher than that on domestic investment. Roberts (1976, p.
193) calculates a large transfer of resources from Northern Rhodesia to Britain, in return for minimal
investment. Manning (1982) estimates that between 1905 and 1914, 50 percent of GDP in Dahomey was
extracted by the French, Young (1994, p.125) notes that taxation rates in Tunisia were four times higher
than those in metropolitan France, and Peemans (1975) documents the amount of resources extracted
from the Belgian Congo and calculates that tax rates on Africans approached 60 percent of their income
during the 1920’s and 1930’s.
12Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001) document that the crucial determinant of
whether Europeans chose the path of extractive institutions was whether or not they
settled in large numbers. In colonies where Europeans settled, institutions were developed
for their own future beneﬁts. In colonies where Europeans did not settle, they often set up
a highly centralized state apparatus, and other similar institutions, to oppress the native
population and facilitate the extraction of resources in the short run. Based on this
idea, Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001) suggest that in places where the disease
environments made it easy for Europeans to settle, the path of institutional development
should have been diﬀerent from areas where Europeans faced high mortality rates.
In practice, during the time of colonization, Europeans faced widely diﬀerent mortality
rates in colonies because of diﬀerences in the prevalence of malaria and yellow fever.12
The argument in Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001) is that diﬀerences in mortality
rates of potential settlers, driven mostly by malaria and yellow fever, provide a possible
c a n d i d a t ef o rt h ev a r i a b l eZ above: these mortality rates should not inﬂuence output
today directly; but by aﬀecting the settlement patterns of Europeans, they may have had
a ﬁrst-order eﬀect on institutional development. The idea that these mortality rates should
not have a direct eﬀect is plausible. Malaria and yellow fever were fatal to Europeans
who had no immunity, thus having a major eﬀect on settlement patterns, but they had
much more limited eﬀects on natives who, over centuries, had developed various types of
immunities.13
The data support the notion that there were major diﬀerences in the institutional
development of the high-mortality and low-mortality colonies. Figure 1 shows a measure
of property rights enforcement–the protection against expropriation risk–against the
logarithm of potential European settler mortality in 1000 mean strength soldiers (see
Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson, 2001 for details). Expropriation risk is much greater
in places where Europeans faced higher death rates and did not settle.
12See Appendix Table A2 in Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001) for the variation in the mortality
rates of European military and clergy in the various colonies. Before 1850, the annual mortality rates for
a settlement size maintained at 1000 (via replacement) ranged from 8.55 in New Zealand (lower than in
Europe at that time) to 49 in India, 130 in Jamaica, and around 500 in West Africa.
13This “exclusion restriction” is supported by the death rates of natives in these areas. For example,
Curtin (1964) reports that the annual death rates of native troops serving in Bengal and Madras were
respectively 11 and 13 in 1000. These numbers are similar to the annual death rates of British troops
serving in Britain, which were approximately 15 in 1000. In contrast, the death rates of British troops
serving in these colonies were much higher because of their lack of immunity. For example, death rates
in Bengal and Madras for British troops were between 70 and 170 in 1000.
13Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001) also show that these institutional diﬀerences
induced by mortality rates and European settlement patterns have a major eﬀect on in-
come per capita.14 For example, the estimates imply that improving Nigeria’s institutions
to the level of those in Chile could, in the long run, lead to as much as a 7-fold increase
in Nigeria’s income. These results have a clear interpretation: in practice, societies do
choose very diﬀerent institutions, and not because of diﬀerences in output-relevant vari-
ables, the X’s, but because of other political/historical circumstances, the Z’s, in this
case the mortality rates faced by early European settlers. Moreover, these institutional
choices have a major eﬀect on economic performance. These results suggest that the
PCT, which emphasizes the forces that push societies towards the correct institutions
and policies, does not provide a useful framework for analyzing the major institutional
and policy diﬀerences across countries.
3.3 Another Experiment: North Versus South Korea
Another example that illustrates how societies with very similar conditions, but diﬀerent
histories or political equilibria, may end up with very diﬀerent economic and political insti-
tutions, and consequently with divergent economic performances, is the contrast between
North and South Korea.
Until the end of World War II, Korea was under Japanese occupation. Korean in-
dependence came shortly after the Japanese Emperor Hirohito announced the Japanese
surrender on August 15, 1945. After this date, Soviet forces entered Manchuria and North
Korea and took over the control of these provinces from the Japanese. The United States
did not want to leave the control of the Korean peninsula to the Soviet Union, and with
“General Order No. 1,” President Truman proposed a joint occupation of Korea, with
the division between the north and south at the 38th parallel. The major fear of the
United States during this time period was the takeover of the entire Korea either by the
Soviet Union or by communist forces under the control of the former guerrilla ﬁghter, Kim
Il Sung. U.S. authorities therefore supported the inﬂuential nationalist leader Syngman
Rhee, who was in favor of separation rather than a united communist Korea. Elections
14That paper also documents that this eﬀect of institutions on economic performance is robust to
excluding Australia, New Zealand, Canada, and the United States, or Africa, to controlling for various
geography variables such as distance from the equator (latitude), continent dummies, temperature, hu-
midity, whether countries are land-locked, soil quality, natural resource abundance etc. They also obtain
similar results using only yellow fever prevalence, which is an attractive source of variation, since yellow
fever is now mostly eradicated.
14in the South were held in May 1948, amidst widespread boycott by Koreans opposed to
separation. The newly elected representatives proceeded to draft a new constitution and
established the Republic of Korea to the south of the 38th parallel. The North became
the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, under to control of Kim Il Sung.15
A distinguishing feature of Korea before separation was its ethnic, linguistic and eco-
nomic homogeneity. The north and south are inhabited by essentially the same people,
w i t ht h es a m ec u l t u r e ,a n dt h e r ew e r eo n l ym i n o re c o n o m i cd i ﬀerences between the two
areas. If anything, at the time of separation, the North was more industrialized; for ex-
ample, production levels of heavy industrial output were almost four times as high in the
North as in the South, despite the larger size and population of the South (production of
light industry in turn was greater in the South, see Ha-cheong, 1988).
After separation, policies and institutions diverged substantially in the two countries.
The North, under the leadership of Kim Il Sung, adopted a centralized command economy
with little role for individual enterprise. Kim Il Sung advocated and largely imposed a
philosophy he named “Juche”, which played an important role both in the political and
economic life in North Korea. This philosophy emphasized self-reliance and the control
of resources by the communist party and the state which, in turn, were supposed to
represent the people. All non-labor factors of production were under the control of the
state, which directly made the majority of the key economic decisions. Before the separa-
tion, industries in North Korea were concentrated in mining, electricity, steel, chemicals,
transportation, communication and cement. Most of these were quickly nationalized.
There were also many small household industries and producers, and these were forced
to join the cooperatives of the Consumer Union, where they were closely supervised and
instructed by the state. For all practical purposes, there were no private property rights
for individuals (see, for example, Koo, 1992, or Eberstadt, 1999).
In contrast, South Korea, though far from a free-market economy, relied on a capitalist
organization of the economy, with private ownership of the means of production, and legal
protection for a range of producers, especially those under the umbrella of the chaebols,
the large family conglomerates that dominated the South Korean economy. Although
Syngman Rhee, and subsequently General Park, were highly dictatorial, for a variety of
reasons beyond the scope of this paper, they refrained from the most predatory policies.
In fact, General Park was generally supportive of economic development, and his regime is
15See Cumings (1997) and Buzo (2002) for recent histories of Korea.
15often credited with facilitating, or even encouraging, investment and rapid growth in Korea
(e.g., Evans, 1998, Wade, 1990). Even though many South Korean economic policies, such
as protected domestic markets, entry barriers and subsidized loans, directly favored the
chaebol, there were no major violations of property rights for the rest of the society, and
the state actively subsidized and encouraged education. Overall, South Korean economic
institutions were highly capitalistic, even though the government intervened more than
the simplest textbook model of free-market capitalism would suggest.
Under these two highly contrasting regimes, the economies of North and South Korea
diverged. In 1950, according to Maddison (2001), both North and South Korea had
approximately the same income level, $770 (in 1990 International Geary-Khamis dollars).
In the 1990s, before the collapse of the Soviet system and the cessation of Soviet aid,
Maddison (2001) estimates per capita income in North Korea to be around $2,841, less
than one-third of the income per capita in South Korea, which stood at $8,704. The South
Korean government estimates the North Korean GDP per capita to be less than 1/6th
of the South Korean per capita in 1990 (see www.bok.or.kr). In any case, there is no
doubt that income in North Korea in 1990 was inﬂated by Soviet aid, and since then, the
North Korean economy has been shrinking, while South Korea continued to grow rapidly.
According to Maddison (2001), there is now an over 10-fold diﬀerence: income per capita
is $12,152 in South Korea vs. $1,183 in North Korea. Figure 2 shows the divergence in
income per capita between South and North Korea using Maddison’s (2001) numbers.
Overall, since 1950, South Korea grew rapidly under capitalist institutions and poli-
cies, while North Korea experienced minimal growth, under communist institutions and
policies. This “experiment” of dividing this homogeneous country into two parts with
very diﬀerent policies and institutions gives another clear example of how, despite the
very similar economic conditions, political leaders often choose very diﬀerent policies,
with very diﬀerent outcomes.
3.4 Conscious Choices or Belief Diﬀerences?
Can we interpret the diﬀerences in institutional development across the European colonies
or the divergence in the institutions and policies between the North and South of Korea
as resulting from diﬀerences in beliefs? For example, could it be the case that while Rhee,
Park, and other South Korean leaders, believed in the superiority of capitalist institutions
and private property rights enforcement, Kim Il Sung and Communist Party members in
16the North believed that communist policies would be better for the country?
In the case of South versus North Korea, this is certainly a possibility. However,
even if diﬀerences in beliefs could explain the divergence in institutions in the immediate
aftermath of separation, by the 1990s or even by the 1980s, it was clear that the communist
economic policies in the North were not working. The continued eﬀorts of the leadership
to cling to these policies and to power can only be explained as those leaders wishing to
look after their own interests at the expense of the interests of the population at large.
Currently, North Korean leaders, the Communist Party and the bureaucratic elites are
prolonging the current system, which gives them greater economic and political returns
than the alternative, while fully realizing the costs that the system imposes on the North
Korean people, including the famine that much of the population has been suﬀering over
the past several years.
Diﬀerences in colonial policies make an even clearer case for the importance of social
and distributional conﬂict leading to ineﬃcient policies and persistently ineﬃcient insti-
tutions. It was the same British colonists who established diﬀerent institutions in very
diﬀerent parts of the world: in the Caribbean and Southern United States, they set up
plantation societies based on slavery, supported by highly oppressive institutions. In con-
trast, the institutions they developed in areas where they settled, and where there was no
large population of Indians or slaves to be oppressed, such as Northeastern United States,
Canada, Australia and New Zealand, were democratic, encouraged participation, imposed
checks and balances on politicians and political elites, and generally enforced the property
rights of a broad cross-section of society.16 Moreover, diﬀerences in the incentives of the
colonists in various colonies are easy to understand: when they did not settle, they were
choosing the institutions simply to extract resources from the native population. When
they settled in large numbers, institutions and policies were set in place in order to protect
them in the future and encourage investment and prosperity.
16An interesting example of how the same groups adopted very diﬀerent colonization strategies and
organizations of society in response to diﬀerent incentives is the experience of the Puritans in the New
World. While the colony of Massachusetts Bay, formed in 1630 by the English Puritans is hailed as
an example of good institutions introduced in the colonies by a group seeking economic and religious
freedom, at the same time a group of Puritans sponsored by the powerful Puritan interests in England
formed a colony in Providence Island in the Western Caribbean. Slavery was immediately adopted in
this colony, and the most proﬁtable endeavor for those settling on this island was attacking and pirating
Spanish ships in the area (see Kupperman, 1988).
174 Commitment Problems and The Political Coase
Theorem
In the previous section, I developed the argument that the PCT, in its simple or modiﬁed
form, does not provide a good framework for thinking about the major cross-country
diﬀerences in institutions and policies. The argument was essentially empirical. In this
section, I turn to a discussion of why we should expect socially and politically powerful
groups to often extract resources from the rest of the population in ineﬃcient ways and
set up bad institutions. In other words, why should we expect the PCT not to hold?
The basic idea is that the reasoning of the Coase Theorem requires transfers from one
party to another, and all such transfers cannot be made at the same time. Therefore,
some type of “enforceable contracts” specifying future transfers are necessary. And yet,
when such transfers are between the citizens and the state (or groups controlling the
state), there is a major commitment problem: there is no outside party to enforce such
contracts, and those controlling the state can renege on their promises. Only “incentive
compatible” or “self-enforcing” arrangements can be made. These inherent commitment
problems often rule out the reasoning of the PCT.
To simplify the discussion, I focus on the case with no belief diﬀerences, i.e., the PCT,
though obviously the discussion here applies to the Modiﬁed PCT as well.
4.1 Description
Consider the following inﬁnite horizon economy. Time is discrete and indexed by t.T h e r e
are two groups of agents, a ruler, and a mass 1 of identical citizens. All agents discount
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where ct+j is consumption and et+j is eﬀort (investment), and the term (1 − α) is intro-















There is also another inferior production technology, which has the advantage of being









where b<1. I denote the decision to produce for the market by mt ∈ {0,1},a n dw h e n
mt =0and the individual uses the non-market technology, his market income is yi
t = R,
so income from natural resources, R, remains taxable.17
In the ﬁrst-best–eﬃcient–allocation, only the superior market technology would be
used, and the level of investment would satisfy:
∂f
∂et
=1⇐⇒ et = e
fb ≡ 1
There is a ruler with the power to tax the citizens. The ruler does not contribute to
the production process, but because he has all the means of coercion, he can take as much
of the output in the market sector as he wishes. This clearly ignores useful roles of rulers
and of the state, such as law enforcement, public good provision, regulation and defense.
This is only for simplicity, since these roles are not essential for the theory here.18
The feasibility constraint that determines the maximum tax per person that the ruler
can impose is





where Y denotes aggregate output. In addition, the taxation technology needs to be
speciﬁed. The most general case would be when the ruler speciﬁes the person-speciﬁc
taxes, T
j
t ,f o re a c hi n d i v i d u a lj. I return to a discussion of this issue below.
Rulers have the same discount factor, β, as the citizens, but because of internal power
struggle, they can also lose power to another ruler with exogenous probability q (see
Acemoglu, 2002, for a similar model where this probability is endogenized). The current
ruler can also decide to relinquish his power, in which case there are no more rulers in the
future, and nobody can tax the citizens. I refer to this case loosely as “democratization,”
though it lacks many of the interesting features of real-life experiences of transitions to
democracy (see Acemoglu and Robinson, 2000a, for a model of democratization). I will
make two alternative assumptions regarding what type of contracts can be enforced: (i)
contracts that citizens write with a current or previous ruler can be, at least partly,
17The presence of market income, even when individuals withdraw from market production will ensure
that rulers continue to get positive return.
18See Acemoglu and Verdier (1998) for a model where government plays a useful role, but also govern-
ment oﬃcials are corrupt and their actions distort private incentives.
19“enforced”; (ii) no enforcement of such contracts. The plausible case is clearly (ii), but
( i )i su s e f u lt oa n a l y z ea sab e n c h m a r k .
T h et i m i n go fe v e n t sw i t h i ne a c hp e r i o di sa sf o l l o w s :
1. If contracts are available, parties sign contracts. If there has been no democratiza-
tion in the past, i.e., r =0in all past periods, then the ruler decides whether to
relinquish his power, r =0or r =1 .
2. Individuals choose how much to invest, e, and whether or not to produce in the
market sector, m =0or 1.
3. If r =0in all previous periods, the ruler decides how much aggregate tax T (Y )
to impose on the citizens, as a function of aggregate income Y .I f r =1in some
previous period so that there is “democracy”, then a citizen decides how much tax
S (Y ) to impose on each individual to be given to a previous ruler.
4. Consumption takes place.
5. If there has been no democratization, it is revealed whether or not the ruler will be
in power in the next period (he is replaced with probability q).
This timing of events introduces the assumption that not all transactions can be
made at the same time; citizens invest ﬁrst, and rulers set taxes after. So some type
of “contracts”, implicit or explicit, are necessary.19 The history of play in this repeated
game, ht, includes all the actions up to that point. The strategy of a ruler consists of a
mapping σ(·|ht), which determines (r,T (Y )) in every period for a given history ht.T h e
level of taxes T is in turn conditioned on the level of output, since, according to the timing
of events, taxes are determined after citizens make their investment and sector choices,
and also because taxes can never exceed the level of output. The strategy of citizens
consists of a mapping ρ(·|ht),w h i c hd e t e r m i n e s(m,e,S (Y )) for a given history of the
game ht (I am focusing on symmetric equilibria where all citizens use the same strategy,
hence I specify only one strategy mapping for the citizens, ρ(·|ht)). The investment and
19This game also introduces a possible distinction between institutions and policies: institutions may
correspond to whether the society is democratic, i.e., who has the right set taxes, while policies corre-
spond to the choice of actual taxes. Nevertheless, my focus here is not to clarify the distinction between
institutions and policies, but highlight the forces that prevent the eﬃcient choice of policies (and institu-
tions).
20sector choices of citizens are conditioned on the actions of the ruler in the same period
that are observed before the citizens’ actions.
A subgame perfect equilibrium is deﬁned as a strategy σ(·|ht) f o rt h er u l e ra n da
strategy ρ(·|ht) for all citizens that are best responses to each other in all subgames, i.e.,
for all ht. To simplify the discussion throughout, I focus on stationary equilibria, where
t h es a m es t r a t e g i e sa r ep l a y e da ta l ld a t e s .
4.2 The No-Cooperation Benchmark
Let us start with “no-cooperation benchmark,” which features r =0 , i.e., no democrati-
zation, and no contracts between rulers and citizens.
Proposition 1 Suppose r =0 . Then there exists an equilibrium in which all citizens
expect the ruler to grab everything, so they use the informal sector technology, m =0
and e = b. The ruler sets T (Y )=Y .
It is straightforward to see that this allocation is an equilibrium. It is a weakly dom-
inant strategy for the ruler to grab everything, which along the equilibrium path will
simply be the income from natural resources, R. And if an individual deviates and pro-
duces more, this will not increase his consumption, since the ruler is grabbing everything.
So the citizens choose m =0 , i.e., production with the nonmarket technology, and they
invest the optimal amount for this technology, e = b.
For future reference, denote the values of the citizens and the ruler in this equilibrium








1 − β (1 − q)
. (3)
This equilibrium is highly ineﬃcient. For example, a contract along the following lines
would constitute a Pareto improvement: the ruler relinquishes power, and the citizens
promise him a side payment of R+ε every period thereafter. Then, they would all choose
market production, e =1 ,a c h i e v i n gt h eﬁrst-best equilibrium. The focus below will be
on whether this type of arrangement can be made to improve the allocation of resources
away from that speciﬁed in Proposition 1.
214.3 The Political Coase Theorem With Commitment
Next I discuss the equilibrium allocation when enforceable contracts between rulers and
citizens are possible. In this discussion, I will say that a Political Coase Theorem (PCT)
applies when, even in the absence of full property rights for citizens, the economy generates
the same allocation (and when the distribution of political power between the citizens and
the ruler is irrelevant for the allocation).
There are three diﬀerent ways in which this result may emerge: with full commitment
on the side of the ruler, with full commitment on the side of citizens, and with limited
commitment. In this subsection, I discuss the ﬁrst two cases, leaving the third, which is
the central focus of this analysis, to the next section.
First suppose that the ruler can commit to impose a tax level T during this period
(more speciﬁcally, T (Y )=m i nhT;Y i), and assume that q =0 , so that there is no ruler
replacement. This means that each citizen will pay a tax level T. Then, each citizen knows
that he will be able to keep any level of production above T. The following program gives
the equilibrium allocation that satisﬁes the PCT, yielding the largest surplus to the ruler,













1−α − (1 − α)e + R − T
¤
≥ c W, (4)
where the left-hand side of (4) is the return to citizens when they invest e,a n da r e
taxed T, and the right-hand side, c W, is the value that citizens can obtain opting out of
the formal sector, given by (2). The solution to this problem is straightforward: T =
α(1 − b)+R (or more formally, T (Y )=m i n hα(1 − b)+R;Y i)a n dr =0for the
ruler, and e =1and m =1for all the citizens. The important point is that the eﬃcient
allocation is achieved despite the fact that political power is in the hands of the ruler. The
reason for this is the commitment power of the ruler: by committing to the tax schedule
T (Y )=m i nhα(1 − b);Y i, the ruler is making the citizens the residual claimant after a
certain level of investment, and this encourages them to undertake the ﬁrst-best level of
investment.
The above program was special in that it gave all the “bargaining power” to the ruler.
Alternatively, we can have some of the rents from achieving the PCT shared between the
22ruler and the citizens. The simplest way to illustrate this is to assume that rents between
citizens and rulers are shared by Generalized Nash Bargaining. By the same reasoning as
above, citizens will choose the eﬃcient level of investment, e =1 ,s oi m p o s i n gt h i sl e v e l
























subject to (4), where θ is the bargaining power of the citizens. The ﬁrst bracket is
the return to citizens net of their outside option, which is production for the non-
market sector with net present value, αb/(1 − β). The second bracket is the net re-
turn to the ruler above his outside option of taxing, only the income from natural re-
sources. The solution to this problem has T =( 1− θ)α(1 − b)+R (or more formally,
T (Y )=m i n h(1 − θ)α(1 − b)+R;Y i)a n dr =0for the ruler, and e =1and m =1
(production in the market sector) for all citizens. Note that the surplus from citizens pro-
ducing in the market sector and undertaking the ﬁrst-best level of investment (over the
alternative of non-market production) is α(1 − b). This surplus is being shared between
the citizens and the ruler. Income from “natural resources,” R, goes entirely to the ruler,
since the ruler can obtain this even when citizens do not “cooperate”. As the bargaining
power of citizens, θ,g o e st oz e r o ,w eo b t a i nt h et a xl e v e la b o v e ,T = α(1 − b)+R .
Once again, the important point is that the eﬃcient allocation is achieved, thanks to the
commitment power of the ruler. Moreover, the model also illustrates that the distribution
of political power between the ruler and the citizens, θ,d o e sn o ta ﬀect the eﬃciency of
the allocation; m =1and e =1irrespective of θ.
This solution is slightly more involved when the ruler can be replaced by a new ruler,
i.e., q>0. In this case, rulers have a preference for front-loaded payments, since they may
not be be around in the future, i.e., they discount the future at the rate β (1 − q),w h i c hi s
less than the discount factor of citizens, β. However, citizens dislike making front-loaded
payments to current rulers, since in case these rulers are replaced, these payments are
lost, and additional payments have to be made to new rulers. These two eﬀects cancel
each other, and the problem is still stationary. In particular, now the allocation will be a

















1 − β (1 − q)
−
R
1 − β (1 − q)
¸1−θ
,
23subject to (4). This only diﬀers from (5) because the discount factor of the ruler is diﬀerent
due to potential replacement at the end of the period. The solution is straightforward to
characterize, and is identical to above. With complete contracts, the discount factor of
the ruler does not matter for the equilibrium allocation.
Next suppose that the ruler cannot commit to a tax level T, but citizens can commit
to a future path of transfers, {St} if the ruler relinquishes his power. Now the PCT can
be achieved via democratization, i.e., r =1 ; the ruler transfers power to the citizens in
return for their commitment to a future path of transfers. The equilibrium allocation with
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,
subject to (4). The solution is: S (Y )=m i n h(1 − θ)α(1 − b)+R;Y i)a n dr =1for
the ruler, and e =1and m =1for all citizens. Therefore, with commitment to future
taxes and transfers on the side either the ruler or the citizens, the basic logic of the
PCT is powerful, and the distribution of rents between various parties (here the ruler and
the citizens) can be separated from eﬃciency considerations. The ﬁrst-best investment
level is achieved, and the distribution of power, here captured by θ,h a sn oe ﬀect on the
allocation.
Proposition 2 When either rulers or citizens can commit to future transfers, we always
have m =1and e =1 , i.e., the PCT applies.
4.4 Limited Commitment
The above analysis with “contracts” between rulers and citizens is useful as a benchmark,
but has little practical relevance. These types of contracts are not enforceable in the real
world. Contract enforcement requires a third party, typically the state, which possesses
the monopoly of legitimate coercion in the society. Its monopoly of coercion gives the
state the power to force contractors to abide by the terms of the contract, even if ex post
making the speciﬁed payments or the necessary delivery of goods is not in their interests.
When the state is one of the “contractors”, this type of outside enforcement is not
possible. For this reason, it is very diﬃcult for any party with real power to commit to a
24path of future transfers, taxes or actions. Therefore, we cannot hope for the outside en-
forcement when we are dealing with interactions with the state; abiding by the conditions
of the “contract” has to be incentive compatible for the state (and for the citizens).
To highlight these issues, I now analyze the above game without such contracts. I start
with the Markov Perfect Equilibria (MPE) of this game, which does not allow repeated-
game punishment strategies. In the next section, I will analyze non-Markovian equilibria.
Using the above notation, in this simple game, an MPE is deﬁned as a strategy combi-
nation σ(·|ht) for the ruler and ρ(·|ht) for the citizens that are best responses to each
other, and history-independent, i.e., σ(·|ht)=σ(·|h0t) and ρ(·|ht)=ρ(·|h0t) for any
ht and h0t. Thus strategies in a MPE do not depend on the history of the game (more
generally, they depend only on the payoﬀ-relevant state variables, and here there are no
such state variables).
This implies that within each period, we can solve the game by backward induction.
In the last stage, the ruler in power sets the tax. The best action for the ruler is to grab
everything, since the future play of the game, and therefore the continuation payoﬀs, does
not depend on history, so whether or not he has grabbed everything will not have future
repercussions. Hence, T (Y )=Y . Given this, citizens prefer m =0 ,a n dt h e r ei sn o
market production. We are back to Proposition 1.
This is a highly ineﬃcient outcome, and one that both citizens and the ruler would
like to prevent. For example, the ruler would like to promise to set a lower tax, e.g.,
T (Y )=m i nhT;Y i for some T ≤ α(1 − b)+R, which would encourage citizens to stay in
the market and invest up to the ﬁrst-best level of investment. However, no such promises
can be credible (without some type of trigger punishment strategies). The PCT, therefore,
does not apply because of lack of commitment.
Proposition 3 Without the possibility of commitment by the ruler or the citizens to
future actions, the unique Markov Perfect Equilibrium has m =0 ,a n dT (Y )=Y .
5 Incentive-Compatible Promises
5.1 Incentive-Compatible Commitments by the Ruler
The discussion with MPEs ignored possible commitment that can be supported thanks
to the repeated nature of the game. For example, if we allow strategies to depend on
the history of the game, the citizens and the ruler may enter into an implicit agreement
25where the ruler promises not to grab everything because of future rents from continued
m a r k e tp r o d u c t i o nb yt h ec i t i z e n s . T h ei m p o r t a n tp o i n ti st h a ts u c hp r o m i s e sh a v et o
be “self-enforcing” or incentive compatible for the ruler. We can capture these issues by
analyzing the non-Markovian equilibria of this game, where citizens play trigger strategies
to induce the ruler not to grab all the output.
I will undertake this analysis in stages, starting with the case where there is no re-
placement of rulers, i.e., q =0 .M o r e o v e r ,Iﬁrst assume that the citizens can coordinate
their actions and all choose the level of investment e, maximizing their utility as a group.
Thus we can think of the game as one between two players. Later in subsection 5.3, I
will come back to the issues of “free-riding,” where each individual may prefer to choose
ad i ﬀerent level of investment than the one maximizing the utility of the citizens as a
group. These considerations will have interesting implications for the equilibrium form of
taxation.
Consider the following strategy combination for the ruler and the citizens: the ruler
sets the tax T (Y )=m i nhT;Y i as long as citizens have played e0 = e in all past periods,
and T (Y )=Y otherwise; citizens play m =1and e0 = e as long as the ruler has set the
tax T (Y )=m i nhT;Y i in all past periods, and m =0otherwise, and we have T ≤ eα+R.






Since the ruler cannot commit to future taxes of the form T (Y )=m i n hT;Y i,w e
have to ensure that playing the above speciﬁed strategy is optimal for the ruler. The
obvious, and the best, deviation for the ruler from this strategy proﬁle is clearly to grab
everything in the current period. So we have to check that not deviating from this
strategy proﬁle (i.e., not to grab everything today) is incentive compatible. If the ruler
follows the repeated game equilibrium, he obtains V as given by (6). Alternatively, if he
deviates to grab everything today and then switches to the non-cooperative equilibrium
of Proposition 1, he obtains all the output today, e1−α + R, and from today onwards,
he obtains his payoﬀ in the non-cooperative equilibrium of Proposition 1, b V .T h u s t h e
return to deviating is e1−α + R + βb V .
Incentive compatibility for the ruler therefore requires:
e
1−α + R + βb V ≤ V,
26or written more compactly, the incentive compatibility constraint for rulers is
T ≥ Υ(e) ≡ (1 − β)e
1−α + R, (7)
where the function Υ(e) is deﬁned for future reference, and represents the ﬂow value of
grabbing all current output for the ruler when current investment is e.C o n d i t i o n ( 7 )
states that the tax that the ruler receives in each period should be large enough so that
he is not tempted to grab everything.
We also have to satisfy incentive compatibility for citizens, to convince them to stay






1−α − (1 − α)e + R − T
¤
, (8)
which needs to be greater than c W given by (2) for the “equilibrium” e.I no t h e rw o r d s :
T ≤ T
max (e) ≡ R + e
1−α − (1 − α)e − αb. (9)
Here Tmax (e) is the maximum tax that citizens are willing to pay before they switch to
the non-market sector.
I now look for an equilibrium which satisﬁes these two incentive compatibility con-
straints. First, I will check whether the ﬁrst best can be supported, i.e., whether the
allocation with m =1and e =1can be achieved, so that the basic insights of the PCT
generalize to this case without commitment.
To investigate the conditions under which the ﬁrst-best allocation with e =1can be
supported, observe that the maximum tax rate consistent with citizens incentive compat-
ibility constraint is
T
max (e =1 )=R + α(1 − b).
Then the question of whether we can support the ﬁrst-best allocation simply boils down
to whether we can satisfy the ruler’s incentive compatibility constraint, (7) with this tax
level. Combining this with (7), we have:
T
max (e =1 )=R + α(1 − b) ≥ Υ(e =1 )=1− β + R,
which is equivalent to the condition:
1 − β ≤ α(1 − b) (10)
27When (10) is satisﬁed, the basic message of the PCT goes through. Agents can enter into
implicit agreements because the threat of punishment implied by the trigger strategies is
suﬃcient to overcome the inherent commitment problems, and the ﬁrst-best allocation
can be achieved despite the fact that all political power is in the hands of the ruler.
Condition (10) is more likely to be satisﬁed when agents are patient, and the outside
options of citizens are not too attractive, so that the ruler can raise enough taxes in every
period not to be tempted to tax more than the prescribed amount.
Next consider the case where (10) is not satisﬁed, so that the ﬁrst-best investment
level, e =1 , cannot be maintained. Can market participation by the citizens, m =1and
some positive investment in the market sector, e>0, be supported as an equilibrium? The
answer is yes provided that we can satisfy the inequality that the maximum tax citizens
are willing to pay is greater than the ﬂow return to the ruler from grabbing everything:
T
max (e)=R + e
1−α − (1 − α)e − αb ≥ Υ(e)=( 1− β)e
1−α + R, (11)
The left-hand side, Tmax (e), represents the incentive compatibility condition of the citi-
zens, while the right-hand side, Υ(e), corresponds to the incentive compatibility condition
of the ruler.
Figure 3 draws the left- and right-hand sides of this equation in the space of e1−α and T.
For low values of e, Tmax (e) increases faster than Υ(e), so greater investment levels make
it easier to satisfy both incentive compatibility conditions. However, the gap between
Tmax (e) and Υ(e) reaches its maximum at e = β
1/α < 1,w h e r et h es l o p e so ft h et w o
curves are equalized. After this point, Υ(e) grows faster than Tmax (e).T h i sr e ﬂects the
fact that the incentive compatibility constraint of the ruler depends on output, whereas
the incentive compatibility of the citizens depends on the diﬀerence between output and
the cost of investment, which grows less than output.










>T max (e =1 )−
Υ(e =1 ) , and it is easier to satisfy both incentive compatibility constraints at e = β
1/α
than at the ﬁrst-best level of investment. This reﬂects the fact that at maximum eﬀort,
there are strong incentives for the ruler to grab everything today.










> 0 >T max (e =1 )−
Υ(e =1 ) , so while the ﬁrst-best cannot be supported, a range of investment levels, e ∈
[e∗,e ∗∗], can be supported as an equilibrium of the repeated game between the ruler and
the citizens. As we will see in greater detail below, an equilibrium with e = β
1/α is
preferred to any equilibrium with e ∈ [e∗,β
1/α) by both the citizens and the ruler. So





at the set of potential equilibria. It is clear that
this set changes with the underlying parameters. For example, when β increases, the
set becomes larger, and in particular, the highest investment that can be supported, e∗∗,
increases (Figure 3, in fact, shows the case where, with the decline in β,t h eﬁrst-best
level of investment can be supported).
This analysis also gives us a simple condition to check to see whether market produc-
tion can be supported. If we cannot satisfy both incentive compatibility constraints when
e = β
1/α,t h e nt h es e t[e∗,e ∗∗] will be empty. Therefore, the condition for m =1to be
supported is
αβ
1/α ≥ b (12)
Now suppose that condition (12) is satisﬁed, so that the set [e∗,e ∗∗] is non-empty.
Which of the many equilibria, or which of the investment levels in the set [e∗,e ∗∗],w i l lb e
chosen? This paper has little to say on equilibrium selection, so any of these investments,
as well as many others that are Pareto inferior to those on the frontier, may emerge in
equilibrium. Nevertheless, it is useful to brieﬂy discuss which of these equilibria will be
the most preferred by the citizens and by the ruler, and how changes in the distribution
of “power” between the two groups might aﬀect equilibrium selection.
First, consider maximizing the ruler’s utility, (6) subject to (7) and (9) by choosing
e and T. The solution to this problem is e = e∗∗ and Tmax (e∗∗): the ruler would like
to maximize investment and choose the highest possible tax level given that investment.
Incidentally, this is exactly what a social planner who wishes to maximize output would
also choose.
In contrast, citizens would like to maximize (8) again subject to (7) and (9). We
know that as long as e ∈ [e∗,e ∗∗], citizens’ incentive compatibility constraint, (9), will be
satisﬁed, and citizens will never give the ruler more than the minimum amount to satisfy
his incentive compatibility. Therefore, the ruler’s incentive productivity constraint, (7),
has to hold as an equality. A simple way to characterize the solution is then simply to
take this equation and substitute it back into (8). This gives the maximization problem:
maxT
max (e) − Υ(e)=βe
1−α − (1 − α)e,
i.e., citizens would like to maximize the diﬀerence between the left-hand and the right-
hand sides of (11), which has the solution e = β
1/α. Intuitively, increasing eﬀort further is
costly for the citizens, because they pay the additional investment costs, while the ruler
29gets the beneﬁts. Since they do not internalize the ruler’s gains, they prefer e = β
1/α to
the maximum investment that can be supported.



























subject to the two incentive compatibility constraints, (7) and (9), where as before θ is
the bargaining power of the citizens. According to the PCT, the allocation of political
power between the two groups should not matter for the outcome. Here, it will clearly
m a t t e r( a sl o n ga s( 1 2 )i ss a t i s ﬁed, and the set [e∗,e ∗∗] is non-empty). We already saw that
when θ =0 , i.e., when the ruler has all the bargaining power, we obtain e = e∗∗,w h e r e a s
when θ =1 , we obtain the citizens’ most preferred solution, e = β
1/α. Analysis of this
maximization problem establishes that the general solution is e(θ), which is decreasing in
θ with ˆ e(θ =0 )=e∗∗ and ˆ e(θ =1 )=β
1/α.20 That greater bargaining power for citizens
reduces investment and eﬃciency is a somewhat surprising result, but is intuitive ex post.
Recall that the problem is the inability of the ruler to commit to not taxing the returns
from citizens’ investments; so a naive intuition may have been that greater bargaining
power for the citizens would reduce ineﬃciencies. However, the bargaining power θ does
not aﬀect the incentive compatibility constraint of rulers–instead, it determines which
point we choose from the possible set of allocations. Since citizens bear the cost of
investment and receive less than the full return, their preferred investment is less than
that of the ruler. Greater bargaining power for the citizens selects an equilibrium closer
to their desired point, with lower investment and greater net returns for them.
Next consider the case with ruler replacement, i.e., q>0. Since replacement happens
at the end of the period, the only diﬀerence from the above analysis is the value of
20To see this, ﬁrst note that the incentive compatibility constraint of the ruler, (7) has to hold (oth-
erwise, both parties can be made better oﬀ). Using this condition and factoring out constants, the




βe1−α − (1 − α)e − αb
¤θ £
e1−α¤1−θ
Diﬀerentiating and simplifying, we obtain
θ =1+
βˆ e1−α − ˆ e
(ˆ e − b)α
,
which gives dˆ e/dθ < 0 in the range ˆ e ∈
h
ˆ e(θ =1 )=β
1/α, ˆ e(θ =0 )=e∗∗
i
.
30continued cooperation for the ruler. Taking this into account, the relevant comparison for
the ruler is between grabbing everything, which has payoﬀ e1−α +R/(1 − β (1 − q)),a n d
taxing at the prescribed rate, which yields T/(1 − β (1 − q)). Both of these are diﬀerent
from the above expressions because the value of the future is less for the ruler due to the
possibility of replacement. The ruler’s incentive compatibility constraint then becomes:
T ≥ Υ(e) ≡ (1 − β (1 − q))e
1−α + R, (13)
and citizens’ incentive compatibility constraint remains unchanged. This implies that the
ﬁrst-best can now be supported when
1 − β (1 − q) ≤ α(1 − b), (14)
which is more restrictive than (10) for all q>0. Intuitively, the possibility of replacement
reduces the value of future cooperation for the ruler, and makes the ﬁrst-best and the
PCT more diﬃcult to achieve.
The general solution also changes in the same direction. In terms of Figure 3, the curve
for Υ(e) shifts up, and the range of investment levels that can be supported declines. The





















1 − β (1 − q)
−
R
1 − β (1 − q)
¸1−θ
,
subject to (9) and (13). It is straightforward to show that a greater q, i.e., a higher
probability of replacement, reduces the equilibrium level of investment.21 This eﬀect of
the replacement probability, q, contrasts with the case with enforceable contracts, where
q did not matter.
Finally, the corresponding condition for an equilibrium with m =1to be supported
changes to
(β (1 − q))
1/α >b . (15)
Summarizing:
21The mathematical argument mirrors that of footnote 20, and now the relevant expression is
θ =1+
β (1 − q)ˆ e1−α − ˆ e
(ˆ e − b)α
,
which gives dˆ e/dq < 0 in the range ˆ e ∈
h
ˆ e(θ =1 )=β
1/α, ˆ e(θ =0 )=e∗∗
i
.
31Proposition 4 When rulers and citizens cannot commit to future transfers, the PCT
and the eﬃcient allocation can be supported by trigger punishment strategies provided
that (14) is satisﬁed. Otherwise, the level of investment is less than the ﬁrst best, e =1 .
As long as condition (15) is satisﬁed, an equilibrium with market production, i.e., m =1 ,
but e<1, can be supported. In this equilibrium, the level of investment is a decreasing
function of the bargaining power of the citizens, θ, and of the replacement probability of
the rulers, q.
This analysis therefore establishes limits on the reasoning of the PCT because of
the inherent commitment problems in politics. Since there is no outside party with the
coercion capability to enforce contracts between rulers and citizens, promises of rulers have
to be self-enforcing or incentive-compatible. This puts limits on the society’s capacity
to achieve eﬃcient allocations, and on the applicability of the PCT. This is so, even
though the model does not rule out any types of transfers between citizens and rulers on
technological grounds.
5.2 Determinants of Policies and Institutions
T h ea n a l y s i sa n dt h ec o m p a r a t i v es t a t i c sa b o v ep r o v i d eu sw i t has i m p l ei n t e r p r e t a t i o no f
the potential determinants of equilibrium institutions and policies. First, the distribution
of political power between rulers and citizens, θ, matters for the equilibrium outcome when
the PCT does not apply. More interesting, the horizon of the ruler matters. When rulers
are impatient because they fear replacement by other competing rulers, self-enforcing
agreements are harder to maintain because of standard repeated game reasoning. There-
fore, better equilibrium policies will arise when rulers have longer horizons.22 Finally,
better outside options for citizens (leaving only a small surplus to be shared between
rulers and citizens in the market) make cooperation between citizens and rulers more
diﬃcult.
Who designs the game, or the “constitution”, may also be important, especially in
thinking about institutions imposed on a society by external groups, such as colonial
powers. If the political system is set up by the citizens, they will immediately choose
r =1 , i.e., democratic institutions, where rulers do not have the power to tax them.
22See Acemoglu and Robinson (2000b, 2002) for a diﬀerent argument for why rulers who fear replace-
ment may pursue the wrong policies for the society. There, rulers who fear replacement are more likely
to resist the introduction of superior technologies or institutions when these changes can erode part of
their incumbency advantage and potential future political power.
32In contrast, if the original design is by the ruler, or by some political elite, who does
not internalize the interests of the citizens, they will opt for r =0 . Though trivial, this
observation may be important in thinking about why the European colonists introduced
relatively democratic institutions with checks and balances on state and politicians’ power
in colonies where they settled in large numbers (i.e., where they became the “citizens” in
terms of the model above), while establishing or maintaining oppressive and extractive
institutions in colonies where they did not settle and wished to transfer resources from
t h en a t i v ep o p u l a t i o nt ot h e m s e l v e s .
Although the focus of this paper is not to construct a model that can be used to
interpret a wide range of social situations, it is also instructive to attempt to incorporate
“checks and balances” in this simple framework. To do this, I now extend the model
in one dimension to introduce a measure of institutional controls on politicians: costly
replacement of rulers. This analysis is useful both for providing comparative statics with
respect to the extent of checks and balances, and to show the interaction between these
types of institutional constraints on rulers and the implicit constraints that the rulers
place on themselves via self-enforcing agreements.
The only diﬀerence from the baseline model is that I now assume that after the taxes
are set, citizens can attempt to replace the politician, but such replacement costs c (in
terms of the timing of events in subsection 4.1, the replacement decision is after step 3). I
assume that this cost is incurred by all the citizens irrespective of whether they “support”
the replacement of the ruler, so there is no “free-rider” problem.23 If citizens attempt to
replace the ruler, this is successful with probability p.T h ep a r a m e t e rp can be interpreted
as a measure of the quality of checks and balances on politicians: when p is high, citizens
can control the ruler better.
If the current ruler is successfully ousted from power, a new ruler is put in place
the following period. I assume that if the ruler is ousted, he does not receive the tax
revenue from the current period, and to simplify the analysis I also assume that this tax
revenue is not received by the citizens either. Similar results are obtained with alternative
assumptions, but the current set of assumptions simpliﬁes the analysis.
Now suppose the ruler has set the tax T, and is expected to set the same tax in the
future. Let us ﬁrst ignore the incentive compatibility constraint of the ruler, and suppose
that the same equilibrium will be played over time irrespective of whether citizens have
23This refers to free-riding in the decision whether to oust the current ruler, diﬀerent from “free-riding”
in the investment decisions discussed in the next subsection.
33attempted to replace, or have replaced, the ruler or not. Also to further simplify the
discussion, set q =0 .
The citizens have a choice of whether to replace the ruler, at cost c,o rg oa l o n gw i t h
the implicit agreement. The value function of citizens at this point is:
W (e,T)=m a x
½
e1−α − (1 − α)e + R − c − T + βW (e,T);
e1−α − (1 − α)e + R − T + βW (e,T)
¾
. (16)
The upper branch corresponds to the choice to replace, and the lower branch applies when
citizens do not attempt to replace. Notice that the continuation value with or without
replacement is the same, βW (e,T), since there will be a ruler following the optimal policy
after this point, and we are assuming that this new ruler will play the same strategy. The
only diﬀerence between the two branches is the cost of replacement, −c, immediately
implying that citizens will never exercise their option to replace the ruler. It is costly,
and along the equilibrium path, it creates no beneﬁts.24
Nevertheless, the option to replace may have an eﬀect on the equilibrium because
it may be beneﬁcial for the citizens to replace a ruler who has deviated. In particular,
consider a ruler who deviates and grabs all the output. Following this, the citizens and
the ruler will play the no-cooperation game. So the citizens’ continuation value, if they
do not attempt to replace the ruler, is
˜ W (e)=−(1 − α)e + βc W, (17)
where c W is the value of the citizens and the no-cooperation continuation game given by
(2), and −(1 − α)e is the ﬂow return this period, since they have invested e and all the
output is grabbed by the ruler. This expression also incorporates the fact that if citizens
do not replace the ruler now, they will not replace him in any of the following dates.
Next consider the value to the citizens after they attempt to replace the ruler (and
reverting back to never replacing him after this period, if this attempt does not work),
presuming that in the continuation game, citizens will cooperate with a new ruler:
˜ W (e)=−(1 − α)e − c + β (1 − p)c W + βpW (e,T), (18)
where W (e,T) is the equilibrium value. Comparing (17) and (18), we see that as long as
c ≤ pβ
³
c W − W (e,T)
´
, (19)
24This conclusion holds a fortiori if, following an unsuccessful replacement attempt, the ruler and the
citizens revert to no-cooperation.
34citizens will attempt to replace the ruler. Since, by construction, c W − W (e,T) > 0,
condition, (19), implies that for suﬃciently low costs of replacement, i.e., for c → 0,
citizens will attempt to replace rulers who deviate and grab all the output. Citizens’
replacement option will then aﬀect the incentive compatibility constraint of the ruler. In
particular, when (19) holds, a ruler who deviates and grabs everything knows that he
will be replaced with probability p.S i n c ec W − W (e,T) > 0 also in all future dates, the
citizens will attempt to replace the ruler in every future period as well. Taking this into
account, the ruler’s incentive compatibility constraint changes from (7) to





1 − β(1 − p)
¸
,
Thus, the condition for the PCT to hold becomes
(1 − p)(1− β) − α(1 − b) ≤
pR
1 − (1 − p)β
, (20)
which boils down to (10) when p =0 . This condition is more likely to hold when p is
high. Therefore, better checks and balances on rulers, as captured by a higher value of p,
make PCT more likely to hold.
When (20) does not hold, the allocation most preferred by the ruler will be given
by the maximum investment that satisﬁes both the citizens’s and the ruler’s incentive
compatibility constraints, thus by the maximum e that satisﬁes:





1 − (1 − p)β
¸
≤ T
max (e =1 )≡ e
1−α + R − (1 − α)e − αb,
or by ˜ e such that:
αb −
pR
1 − (1 − p)β
≡ [1 − (1 − p)(1− β)]˜ e
1−α − (1 − α)˜ e = αb −
pR
1 − (1 − p)β
. (21)
It is straightforward to check that the solution to this equation, ˜ e,i si n c r e a s i n gi np.
Therefore, a better “technology” for citizens to replace the ruler will lead to greater
equilibrium investments. A similar argument to the one before establishes that market
production, m =1 , can be supported in this case as long as:
[1 − (1 − p)(1− β)]
1/α ≥ b −
pR
α[1 − (1 − p)β]
. (22)
Summarizing this discussion:
35Proposition 5 Consider the game with replacement in this subsection, and suppose that
the cost of replacement, c, small, i.e., c → 0. Then, if (20) holds, the PCT applies and the
eﬃcient level of investment can be supported. Better checks and balances, as captured by
greater p, make (20) more likely to hold. When (20) does not hold, the eﬃcient level of
investment cannot be achieved. But as long as (22) holds, market production, m =1 ,c a n
be supported, and in this case, equilibrium investment is given by ˜ e that satisﬁes (21).
Better checks and balances, i.e., greater p, increase equilibrium investment.
5.3 Free-Riding, Overinvestment and the Form of Taxation
The simple model discussed above also raises another set of interesting issues related to
free-riding among the citizens, and the form of taxation. Once we relax this assumption,
the model delivers a motivation for distortionary taxation.
Suppose that citizens do not coordinate their actions, and the ruler, like before, ob-
serves the aggregate income level, Y , and sets a lump-sum tax T that applies to each
individual. Let us focus on the case where (14) does not hold but (12) holds. This implies
that the ﬁrst-best is not possible, but there exist equilibria with m =1 , market produc-
tion, which feature e<1. Now each individual is facing a lump-sum tax T,a n ds i n c e
i n d i v i d u a l sa r ea t o m i s t i c ,t h e yd on o tt a k et h e i re ﬀect on Y into account. This immedi-
ately implies that the equilibrium with e<1 is no longer possible. Each individual would
like to invest up to e =1 , since each is inﬁnitesimal and is, at the margin, the residual
claimant of the returns from the additional investment. This behavior by all individuals
will take aggregate output to Y =1+R, violating the incentive compatibility constraint
of the ruler, and destroying the equilibrium with market production.
Is there a way to prevent this type of unraveling of the self-enforcing equilibrium? The
answer is yes: move away from lump-sum taxation. As long as simple tax schedules con-
ditional on individual income, yj, are possible, the equilibrium tax schedule can be made
suﬃciently distortionary to induce exactly the right level of investment. For example,
imagine now that the ruler sets the following linear tax schedule Tj (yj)=τ0 + τ1yj.I n
response, investment in the market sector would be e =( 1− τ1)
1/α. Suppose that the
equilibrium that we would like to support has ˆ e<1 and tax level ˆ T. Then in order to
be able to support this equilibrium, and the ruler has to set the following tax schedule
ˆ e =( 1− τ1)
1/α and τ0 = ˆ T − τ1 (1 − τ1)
(1−α)/α. In other words, the tax schedule has
to discourage investment enough so that individuals do not overinvest and violate the
36incentive compatibility constraint of the ruler. Summarizing:
Proposition 6 When citizens choose their investment levels individually, and the ﬁrst-
b e s tl e v e lo fi n v e s t m e n tc a n n o tb es u p p o r t e d , equilibrium taxes have to be distortionary
to discourage citizens from investing up to e =1 .
Therefore, this simple model not only helps in analyzing the commitment problems,
and the limitations of the PCT, but also suggests a reason for apparently ineﬃcient
methods of taxation (even when non-distortionary lump-sum taxes are available). These
non-lump-sum taxes, at face value, appear to distort incentives. Nevertheless, once we
are in the realm of self-enforcing agreements between rulers and citizens, an important
consideration is to prevent citizens from overinvesting. Thus, the form of taxation has to
be such that citizens do not have an incentive to invest too much, that is, citizens should
not be the full residual claimant of the returns from their investments. At this stage, this
explanation for why distortionary taxes may be preferred to non-distortionary alternatives
is simply an implication of the model, and it is not currently clear how important this
rationale is in practice. I leave a more detailed investigation of these issues to future work.
6 Concluding Remarks
There is growing interest and work on the determinants of policies and on the institutional
choices that societies make. Why do some societies choose high taxes, while others opt
for lower taxation? Why do some societies close their borders to trade, while others are
more open? Why are bureaucracies more corrupt in some countries than in others? Why
are some societies democratic, some parliamentarian, some majoritarian, some relying on
common law, etc.?
Much recent work is attempting to answer these questions. The ﬁrst step towards an
answer is to decide who makes the policy and institutional choices, and for whose interests.
Or in other words, do collective choices maximize the output, surplus or welfare of the
society as a whole, or do they select policies and institutions that beneﬁt certain politically
powerful groups, while being detrimental for aggregate output, surplus or welfare? Even
though this latter question is, in some sense, antecedent to the ones posed above, there
is not yet general agreement on the answers.
This paper provides a simple taxonomy for the possible answers to this question. Either
we could subscribe to what I dubbed the “Political Coase Theorem,” which argues that
37societies make eﬃcient (output- or surplus-maximizing) choices, and distribute the gains
from these choices between various groups and individuals. According to this approach,
when societies choose ineﬃcient policies, there will be strong political and social forces
pushing them back towards eﬃcient policies. Alternatively, societies may choose ineﬃcient
policies, not because of a failure in the political process, but because politicians’ and
citizens’ beliefs were “mistaken”. Finally, we can be in the realm of Theories of Social
Conﬂict, which maintain that societies often choose the wrong policies and institutions,
or even pursue disastrous courses of action, because these choices are not made for the
beneﬁt of the society as a whole, but for the beneﬁt of those who control political power.
The bulk of the paper was devoted to arguing that Theories of Social Conﬂict provide
the right empirical and theoretical framework for the analysis of the questions posed above.
But why do politically powerful groups choose policies that reduce aggregate output
rather than choosing the “right” policies, and redistributing the gains to themselves? The
answer this paper developed is that there are serious commitment problems in politics
placing severe limits on the reasoning of the Political Coase Theorem. In other words,
eﬃciency considerations cannot be separated from distributional conﬂicts. The reasoning
of the Political Coase Theorem presumes the possibility of political and economic trades
between various individuals and groups. But these trades are intertemporal, and need to
rely on contracts and promises. Typically, contracts and explicit promises are enforced by
“the state”. When it comes to contracts that the state, or social groups controlling the
state, would like to write with the rest of the society, they will be non-enforceable. This
implies that the allocation of political power creates an inherent commitment problem,
undermining the potential to reach eﬃcient outcomes (naturally, this does not deny the
fact that political and economic forces will sometimes push towards more eﬃcient social
arrangements). I investigated how incentive-compatible promises can make up for lack
of enforceable contracts, but generally fall short of achieving the eﬃcient outcome (or of
validating the Political Coase Theorem). I also developed some comparative statics from
t h es i m p l em o d e lIu s e df o rt h i sp u r p o s e .
This paper is only a preliminary attempt to highlight some of the important issues
that are implicit in much of the recent political economy literature. I believe that the
evidence is clear that Theories of Social Conﬂi c tp r o v i d et h er i g h tf r a m e w o r kf o rf u r t h e r
analysis. But there are certainly factors other than commitment problems important in
preventing the Political Coase Theorem from applying, and even if commitment problems
38a r ew h a tm a t t e rm o s t ,t h ew a yt h i sp a p e rm o d e l e dt h e mm a yn o tb et h em o s tf r u i t f u l
approach. So this paper may be thought of as a call for future research on investigating
t h em a j o rf a c t o r st h a tc a u s ei n e ﬃcient policies and prevent the Political Coase Theorem
from applying.
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